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bstract 
The sector in Hungary faces serious fine.ncial difficulties. Funds a\'ailable are not 
sufficient for reasonable maintenance and de\'elopment of the highway network. 'While fuel 
taxation high incomes to the state budget, the Road Fund itself is poorly financed. 
The present order of Road Cser CLarges is not a real system: it has de\'eloped by random 
decisions according to the actmd financial and politiceJ needs of the gm·ernment. It con-
tains a number of inefficient measures causing unnecessary cross-subsidies and uncovered 
external costs. Having evaluated the international experience on road user charges this 
paper proposes major changes in the Hungarian system. The role of direct charges (tolls, 
parking fees) should be increased - these can ret1ect the real costs of traffic where and 
when they occur while indirect charges should be kept at fair le\·eis. Complicated taxes, 
high administrative costs should be avoided. External costs of accidents. noise. air pollu-
tion are to be internalised. Goods traffic on roads is to be handled in a market compatible 
\\'ay. 
Keywords: transport policy, user charges. highw2_Y economics. 
1. Introduction. The Inherited Position of the 
Highway Sector in Hungary 
Fair charging of road users is a major issue of the transport policy. This 
paper will propose appropriate m.easures in order to move towards a better 
system of Road user Charges. The main objectives were defined by the 
:Vlinistry of Transport, Communication and \Vater ::YIanagement1 (1994b): 
; .. , It would be desirable to arrest and if possible to reverse the 
grmvth in road traffic by diverting it to other means of transport. In order 
to devise appropriate policies and actions it is necessary to determine to 
'.vhat extent users of the roads cover the associated expenses. 
lThis paper is based on the Road l-ser Charges Study. made by the Department of 
Highway and Traffic Engineering for the Hungarian \linistry of Transport. Communication 
and \\'ater :Ifanagement in 1995. 
128 cs. OROSZ - A. l\OI"lCS - GY. G.4LD! 
Delineate a proposal for a system of road user charges for Hungary, 
taking the system that exists in the country and in the international prac-
tice into consideration, that is 
practical and economically efficient to operate 
- equitable to the various types of users 
non-discriminatory. ' 
The inherited position of the Hungarian higlnvay sector is ambiva-
lent, complicated and financially difficult. Ho\vever, some advantages, some 
steps forward may be observed: 
1. The 'Road FUTfd' established 1Il 1989 - ensures reliable financial 
background to the maintenance and to the development of the high-
way sector. 
2. Some motorways and Danube bridges are initiated to be constructed 
by concession system. Construction costs shall be covered by tolls of 
future road users. 
3. Some forms of environment related 
a) product charges (011 petroL tyre, ete.), 
b) differential eeotaxes (reduced 'weight tax' on vehicles with cat-
alytic converters, reduced tax on unleaded petroL etc.) are in-
troduced, and further measures like 
c) emission charges 
d) deposit refund systems (recycling of cars, tyres. etc.) are under 
legal and public preparation. 
4 .. -\s a consequence of points 1, 2 and 3 the Hungarian public opinIOn 
gradually begins to accept (or just tolerate) 
a) the polluter pays principle (under item 
b) the road user pays principle (under items 1 and 2) 
c) the of funds (under items 1 and 3) . 
.J. A cenain part of people (public opinion influencing academic:; among 
them) accepts and spreads the view that roads are not pure public 
goods any mOTe. and they should be handled as 'dub goods' in the 
future. 
'[Club goods' are \yell defined by BCCHA:,J\:; (1965), ROTHE:;G.UTER 
(1992,1993) and TA:\"czos (1994a, b).] 
6. Some 'willingness to pay' in return for better. smoother services can 
be observed among road users. 
Some important disadvantages of the inherited situation: 
7. The whole public transportation sector (yet far from real market) is 
mainly ove,regulated, and destroyed by 
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unnecessary rules; 
inefficient, expensive social concessions that are difficult to fi-
nance (discounts to passengers above 70, above 60, (55), dis-
counts to children, etc.) [YLA.CKETT (1992)]. 
company oriented, lobby dependent subsidies (Budapest Trans-
port Company, Hungarian State Rail'ways, VOL"i~N companies; 
,,"hile nev; entrepreneurs at the market are all handled com-
pletely differently). 
8. Tariffs are low, the public transportation sector is deeply underfi-
nanced. Public tran8port hardly get8 the depreciation C08t8. 
9. Interconnections. inferdependencie8 with other sectors. subsectors, are 
also ambivalent. (The raihvays. health insurance sector, ta.xation mo-
li"ations. eIlforcemem- etc.) Fair proposals to 
internalise external costs and transfer them to another sector (health 
insurance, e.g.) may proye to be waste of money, as ail these sectors 
operate inefficiently. 
10. The mOTal in transportation concerning 
parking regulations, 
speed limits, 
-- bus+taxi lanes. 
- vehicle repair, etc. 
are wor8ening or constantly bad. 
11. Since Octo bel' 1990 (the blockage of roads as a protest against radical 
increase in petrol prices) hauliers and taxi dril1er8 are considered to 
be a sironq pre.,8ure group (lobby). Politicians are afraid to internalise 
external costs because of that reason as \vell. 
12. The 'vote maximi8inq approach [Dow:\s (1968)] of politicians' a 
coming know-ho'w from '\Vestern democracies' leads to controversial 
measures and inconsistency around election campaigns (Subsidy of 
the Road Fund in Hungary: postponement of the introduction of the 
Budapest Parking System, etc.) 
13. The stati8tical database is hardly complete and reliable. Compatibility 
with ELJ methods and terms is not ensured. (Both for transport and 
for other sectors). 
14. Though GDP has been decreasing for years. around one hundred thou-
sand of prestigious company cars are imported year by year. Due to 
the too high taxation, the company car is one of the most important 
promotion methods. Thus 
out of pocket costs are minimi~ed, 
- public policy measures to reduce individual car traffic may not 
be successful in important segments of society. 
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The advantages and disadvantages mentioned here are not properly 
rated, and one might quote other relevant circumstances. Real figures, 
percentages have been shown in the literature, or will be highlighted later 
if relevant. 
Section 6 makes proposals concerning the implementation of the mea-
sures. However, the detailed implementation plan, including 
a) timing of measures: 
b) public participation, public relations: 
c) political and social compromises; 
d) foreign affairs issues 'with the European "[nion, etc. 
is far beyond the scope of this Road User Charges Study. 
Similarly, political acceptance is a hard issue. As there is extended 
,yorld-wide experience ":ith political resistance to any form of road user 
charges, it is quite natural that the case of Hungary and Hungarian politi-
cians may prove to be the same. For this reason this paper sometimes 
proposes alternatiYes, second best solutions highlighting' clearly the dra\\'-
backs of these substitutional options. 
The paper fully appreciates that 
theoreticaL academic justification of measures and 
political acceptability 
are deeply different issues. :\ ot to make a reasonable political compro-
mise concerning the issue may result in that the Hungarian Road Sector 
continues to be funded 
by the exploitation of natural resources: 
by the tax-payers and 
by the health insurance system. 
2. Check ~ or , Taxes and Duties 
Road Users 
Fig. 1 and :2 illustrate the rationale and the techniques of road-user 
- charges, 
taxes. 
duties. 
It should also be mentioned that beside user charges 
legal requirements, and 
physical restraint 
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a) O'.·mershl~D F=(egulation 
Annual 
Licence 
Fee 
2. Demand mitnagement methods for roa.d use. Proposed meC!sures for 
a) ownership regula.tion: b) usage regulation: c) behaviollral incentives 
Codes: Preliminary opinion about proposed future application in Hungary. 
B - business as usual: I - increase: In introduce: In+I introduce !!1-
crease: N not needed: R keep itt real \·alue: S supervision needed 
are also influencing 
vehicle o\Yllership (cars and trucks). 
vehicle usage (mode choice. trip timing. trip assignment, ete.) 
behaviour. attitudes, habits in transportation. 
Figure b. shows the most important regulatory (legal), physical 
and fiscal (user charges) methods that regulate vehicle ovmership, usage 
and trawl beha\'iour. That comprehensiw list of methods is taken from 
HAL' (1992) (\\"orking for the World Bank). 
A comprehensive policy on land-use and transport should use these 
_. reg111aiol'Y· 
and fiscu.l 
instrumenTs In a co-ordinated. syncrgetic way. All elements sho'wn in Fig. 2 
should be anal~'sed ",'hen creating the transport and fiscal policy of a coun-
try or a to'\'11. :\lost elements should be analysed t"\yice. first for cars, then 
for trucks. (Sometimes certain instruments should be analysed abo for 
buses and motorcycles). The codes at the eiemellts of the figure refer to 
the possible future application. 
3, Urban Traffic Problems 
Table 1 shO\\'5 the increase of dail~' traffic flO\vs on Danube Bridges of 
Budapest. Looking at the lo\-;;er part of Table 1 the increase of car and 
goods vehicle traffic shO\-;;s significant differences. As it: can be seell in the 
last column: 
the 1994 - 1965 ratio \\"ith goods Yehicles is 1.28. while 
the 1994 1965 ratio with cars is ·5.·54 (!). 
The typical case for generated traffic may be observed \\'ith :\10 ex-
press\','ay and Pet6fi Bridg'e in years 1990 1994. In the same period traffic 
of other Danube bridges in the country decreased. These facts clearly jus-
tify that though it is ah\"ays popular to blame 
a) freight traffie. 
b) transit traffic. 
c) international transit traffic (foreigners), 
ho\,;ever. congestion in Budapest is mainl:y caused by passenger cars (pos-
sessed by citizens of Budapest). Congestion in other larger cities is also 
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Table 1 
Road traffic volumes on Danube bridges in Hungary 
Figures in Budapest and in the country in the period 1931 1994 
(Data when and where available) [1000 p.c.u./day; 1000 veh./day] 
Br-id9.es in Budapest. 1931 1943 19.54 196.5 1980 
Arpad Bridge jall [p.c.u./day] 4.9 17.8 .5.5.8 
Margit Bridge 7.4 13.6 10.2 2.5 . .5 .57.1 
Kossuth Bridge 4.0 
Chain Bridge (Lanchid) 9.3 9.6 10.0 24.2 :3,5.1 
Erzsebet Bridge 3.7 7.1 17.9 89.4 
Liberty Bridge (Szabadsag) /.3 8.0 7.7 1:3.6 36 . .5 
Petofi Bridge .5.6 /.6 28.:3 60.0 
MO expressway (South) 
Total Traffic 27./ n.9 44.4 127.3 :3:3:3.9 
Index (of Total) [196.5=1.00] 0.22 0.:3-1 0.::).5 1.00 2.:3/ 
Index of Goods Vehicles [196,5= 1.00] 1.00 1.,).5 
Number of Goods Vehicles [p.c.u.jdai·] 39.3 60.9 
Index of Cars [196.5= 1.00] 1.00 :3.39 
Number of Cars [p.c.u.jday] 6,5.9 223.2 
B7'idges in the counl7'Jj 19:31 19-13 19.54 196.5 1980 
DunafoldvciT WOO p.c.u./day 
1000 veh / day 
Number of cars [veh.jday] 
Number of Goods Vehicles 
Baja 1000 p.c.u.jclay 
1000 vell/d,,), 
N umber of cars 
N umber of Goods Vehicles 
caused mainly by cars. There are a lot of things to be done ill parking 
as well. 
4. The Problem of Road Track Cost Allocation 
According to the A,~SHO-Road Test (1960) the damage to the road 
pavement structure increases by the fourth power of the axle load. This 
fact could justify far much higher Goods Vehicle charges and car charges 
even lower than the present ones (",-eight taxes or <1111lUal license fees). 
HO\vever, some part of the costs must be allocated to cars as capacity 
cost. Careful German research resulted ill the allocation method shO\vecl in 
Table 2 [Source E\,FRAS-I\V\V (1994)J. The S\wdish allocation method is 
basically the same. The only difference is in the weighting factor for Goods 
Vehicles: (That is 3.66 instead of 3.6). 
PHO?05AL TO~·.·.'1RDS .,~ [:'AIE SYSTE.\f 
..\rpad Bridge jail [p.c.u./dayJ 
:vlargit Bridge 
Kossuth Bridge 
Chain Bridge (Lanchid 
Erzsebet Bridge 
Liberty Bridge (Szz~badsag) 
Petofi Bridge 
MO expressway (South) 
Toi(1/ 
Index 19b'S=1.UU 
Index of Goods Vehicles 
.\;umber of Goods Vehides f 
IndeX of Cars [1965=1 
\'umber of Cas 
Bridges in the coun/:f,1 
1000veh/d"y 
.\umber Olears 
.\;llmber of Goods Vehicles 
B(1ja 1000 p.c.u./day 
1000 
.\ umber of cars 
.\llmber of GOOl!,; Vehicle" 
Table 1 
(continued) 
19~8 1989 1990 
S7.S 83 .. 5 8:3.1 
71.1 55.:3 ·5·5.:3 
:31.9 29.S 3:3.8 
78.1 72.0 69.0 
2.5.1 23.0 2S.S 
96.0 7.5.1 82.1 
1I0.·S :j::J8:j :3.5 1.9 
:3.:23 2.ijG .) -.., _0 i I 
i.G-l 1.:35 1 - ,. , .:)\) 
6-1.:3 52.S 61.2 
L97 -1.13 ~io27 
:327.2 272.2 :28 L.4 
1988 1980 ;990 
12.6]) 1;3.2p 
SAlv 9.2.5\' 
S.lS" G.2.5\· 
2.67\ 2.-nv 
I.Gp 
'j .-l:3\" 
3.:33v 
1.·llv 
13.5 
1991 1994 
92.6 i 11.1 
70.8 6-1.1 
:31.1 2.5.8 
8-1.1 88.3 
:30.5 31.1 
'S.' 72.0 
11.9 :39.5 
:399.7 ,1:31.9 
:3.14 :3.:39 
U7 1.28 
S7.1 .50.1 
4.99 .5.·54 
:328., 36.5.0 
1991 1993 
12.4p 12.9p 
8.S0v g.OSv 
.5.7-h 6.2.5v 
:oU8v 2.36v 
(j.G p 6 . .5D 
4.'Sv 4.90v 
:3.0,\' ~3.31 v 
1.15\' O.96v 
The ruited Kingdom applies another vvell-based approach. The r.K. 
method is used for about 30 years, and it is much more detailed than the 
German calculation. To be brief only the final CK. ratios are shown in the 
last columll of Table 2. 
As the Department of Transport (1994) bulletin sho\,\'s the 'Taxes to 
costs' ratios are 
3.5:1 ill case of cars. vans and taxis. 
0.3:1 with buses. 
1.2:1 with Goods Vehicles. 
These ratios refiect that tmffic of Goods Vehicles is conside-red to be 
part of normal operai1:on of economy, while car tmffic is ta:red strictly. 
Results of Ta.ble 2 and analysis of tax collection data prove that the ratio 
paid to the Road Fund by cars and goods vehicles is reasonable. 
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Table 2 
The German allocation method to distribute road track costs 
(Applied with available (1993) Hungarian data and compared with UE. results) 
Weighting 
factor 
1 X 
3 X 
0.33 X 
3.6 X 
\\'eighted Annual performance 
[109 ... km j pcukm and % 
22.5 carkm = 22.50 
1.0 buskm = 3.00 
0.6 motorcycle km 0.2 
3.65 Goods Vehicle km = 13.14 
Other 
57.9% 
7.7% 
0.5% 
:33.8% 
:\ecessary U.K. 
contribution ratios 
to the Road (comparison) 
Fund 109 HUr 
12.57 
0.97 
0.11 
7.35 
61.7 
4.1 
0.'1 
31..1 
2.4' 
Total: 38.84 - 100% 21 X 109 HUF 100 
'special pcukm' Road fund (199:3) 
----------------------
2.4% is allocated to 'other' (crown. disabled. etc.) \'ehiclcs in the UE. 
I ECU = 137.36 HUr constant [.Jan. 10. 1995] 
5. Some Further Notes to the Future System of Road 
User Charges in Hungary 
5.1. Externai Costs of Road Use in Hungary 
Table 3 contains Road Transport Volume Data of 17 European countries 
together with Hungarian figures from years 1991 and 1993. The comparison 
is really useful with Greece and Portugal. 
sTable 4 gives estimate 011 total external road transport costs in 
Hungary. The figures in the first column sho'\\' I\,,-'X calculations for 
\vhile the second column contains year. 1993 calculations and the estimates 
of a Hungarian panel of experts. :'vlajor differences in the methods are the 
following: 
a) Official Hungarian cost factors are used (9.0 million HCF / fatality for 
e.g.) [SZILH . .\TI (1994) TI.\l..\Il (1992, 1994)] 
b) Reduction offatalities (2120 killed persons in 1991, 1678 killed persons 
in 1993) decreases accident costs as \;;ell. 
c) The multiplication factor of 2.6 [European Federation ... (1993)] is 
not used for injury cost calculation. 
As Table 4 shows getting a major change in accident costs - the 
total external cost of road transport excluding municipal road development, 
- Vehicle km 
Country Cars Goods total Buses Veh. 13 
b veh.km/a 
Austria 42.0 12 0.5 7 ~5~:2i2 
Belgiurn 50.5 2 0.4~. 5.7 3 
Denmark 30.7 2 0.5 2 6.3 2 
Finland 33.1 2 0.7 2 5.4 2 
France 325.0 2 4.0 2 -"105.0 2 
Gennany 406.0 2 3.'1 2 
. 14Jl 2 
Greece 9.4 11 0.5 13 3.4 5 
Ireland.(Rep.) 19.7 1 0.2 1 5.0 5 
. 
Italy 259.B 3 4.B 3 45.5 3 
Lu)(embourg 3.0 3 0.0.; 04 3 
Netherlands 77.8 2 0.6 2 r-12:9 2 
Norway 23.2 7 0.3 7 ----:;-3.1 7 
Portugal 35.0 8 0.6 2 2.0 3 
.-Spain 76.0 2 2.0 2 24.2 2 
Sweden 60.5 1 0.7 1 5.1 1 
Switzerland 48.0 1 0.2 1 4.9 1 
UK 329.7 3 4.3 3 60.0 1 
EUR17 1B29 24 339 
Hungary 
{1991} 23,7 '1:1 4,0 
Hungary 
(1993) 22,5 -1,0 3,65 
1) Questionnaire 1991 
2) IRF World Road Statistics, Edition 199:1. Figures 1991. 
3) IRF World Road Statistics, Edition 1993. FlgUfOS1990. 
4) IRF World Road Slatistics, Edition 1993. Figures 1989. 
5) IRF World Road Slatistics, Edition 1993. Figures 1988. 
6) BMV; Verl<ehr In Zahlan 93. Figures lor 1991. 
7) ECMT Statistical Trends In Transport 65-89. Figures 198. 
~---~--p,;;~;;;;r';;--C-.~--U;;;;",lm' f~ :-
c::c'H-fs;lse;~-r::;;-~" • ,~~I~.dS ca;:]~~JseE P Fr:;;-
billion pkm/a b tkrn/a P/veh Uveh 
72 12 13 7 85.0 -.:; 13.112 1.71 2-1.BS 2.00 2.S2 
75.6 7 :10.5 7 86.2 7 26 3 1.50 26.14 . 1.69 4.52 
55 2 '10.4 2 65.4 2 '10.4 2 
46.4 2 8.1 2 54.5 2 .... 23.8 2 
599 2 43 2 642.0 2 148 .2" 
693 6 71.4 _~ 764.4 6 203 -6 
9.1 9 r---2~ ~_9 12.3 2' 
36.4 1 3.B3 5 40.2 115 5:1 1 
528 " 160 4 688.\~ 167 4 
4.45 10 1.1 10 5.5 10 -OTT 
152 2 13.5 2 '165.5 2 23.3 2 
40:1 3 3.96 3 44:1 3 ~3 
.. 
67 2 10.5 2 77.5 2 10.9 3 
145 2 38.6 2 184.0 2\ 150 2 
91.4 1 10.B 1 102.2 3 25.4 1 
B9 1 
. 2.GIL~ _~_LL.ll 12.8 1 
56B 2 41 2 609.0 2 125 1 
32B2 448 3730 964 
----
47.4 22,5 69,9 "14,-1 
.-
45,0 20,4 65,4 13,2 
B) Assumption: same plvoh. In cam as 
9) Assumption: same plveh. In cars as 
1.79 20.80 2.10 
'1.40 12.46 1.6'1 
·1.B4 '10.75 1.95 
171 21.00 1.B7 
2.03 10.24 2.46 
·1.B5 15.70 2.02 
2.03 33.05·'· 2.60 
1.50 26.14- 1.B4 
'1.95 22.31 2.11 
"1.73 11.92 1.8B 
~ 17.07 2.17 
1.91 19.22 2.36 
1.51 15.21 1.67 
1.B5 14.19 1.90 
"1.72 9.53 1.B2 
"1.79 1B.79 2.01 
-2,0 -20 -2,82 
-2,0 -20 -2,78 
-
10} Assumption, samn p/veh. In cars and public service buses as Belgium 
11) Intercity Traffic only 
12) Statislischas Amt Osterrelch 
13) Incl. al kll\ds of goods vehicles 
14) ERU (Ireland) 1990 
'l'nhle :1 
'1.65 
4.42 
1.41 
4.55 
3.64 
1.01 
3.67 I 
1.90 ! 
1.80 ! 
2.45 
5.40 
6.21 
-"4.97 
2.61 
2.08 
~~4 
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Table 4 
Estimates on total external road transport costs in B ungary 
I Costs (1991) Source IWW (199.5) 
! [Mill. ECU lal 
Costs (1993) Source Panel at BUT 
[Mill. ECU lal I [Billion BUFal 
IAcCidents 2.267 20S (-416) 29 (-.5S) 
Noise 36.3 263 .50 
Air pollution 162 162 22 
Climate change 227 227 31 
Total :3.019 960 (-126S) 132 (-161) 
(414 bn HUFi 
Comparison: Greece 3.240 
I Portugal .5.44.5 I 
administration and police costs may be estimated as: 
132 (-161) billion HUF :::::: 0.96 1.27 billion ECU. 
As F1 (1994) refers to it further research i.s needed to get more precise 
figures both for roads aucl for the whole transport sector. P:W1CS and 1\:1SS 
(1991) gave higher ext erual (0:-:;\ estimates ill their survey. Having great 
elllphasis on health diseases caused by Road Transport, they published a 
value of 7,50/.: of Hungarial! GDP. That is: 
0.07;)· (::::::)4000 billioll :::::: 300 billion HUF :::::: 2.2 billion ECU. 
[Different methods naturally give different values. However. to remain 
in reasonable range it should be noted thbt the total budget for Health 
Insurance \,'as 280 billion HlF (2.04 billion Eel) in year 199.3.j 
5.2. The . of Internalisation 
VVhile section 5.1 showed the very different estimates on external costs. a 
further crucial issue should also be considered. \Vhen trying to internalise 
by 't' taxes. it is important to con,sider the functions shown ill Fig. 3. In 
the INFRAS-I\V\V (1994) study ROTHE:\GATTER thinks about the famou,s 
IRC-Aberle-Engel (1993) document like that: 
, ... But all of these effects are processed through markets yielding 
benefits directly to each actor ill the chain of markets involved. Therefore 
no technological externality can be idelltified ill the listing of the above 
effects. \Vhat call be concluded from this reasoning about 'extra social 
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benefits', ·technological externalities' and the 'cost savings approach' is that 
there is a fuzzy mix of technical terms, theoretical \larshallian arguments 
on pecuniary effects (consumer or producer surpluses) and practical direct 
cost estimations which are used to argue that the external costs for road 
transport are compensated by 'whatsoever' benefits such that pricing the 
external costs is welfare decreasing. 
Trying to find the economic rationale of the IRe study one could 
define the problem as follo\"\'s: An internalisation policy would increase the 
transport costs of road haulage, thus reduce its volume and increase the 
cost of all economic activities i,-hich use :'oad transport as an input factor. 
This would be detrimental to economic \,-elfare if the external cost factors 
are too high. thus leading to an oyerkill of the internalisation policy. Fig. 3 
exhibits such a situation. If the situation withuut external costs 
is denoted by A then a welfare loss (" dead loss') of ABC occurs which can 
be rerrfbved by introducing a tax tl' 
P 
Price 
Kt 
p 
private 
marginal 
costs 
Demal1d 
x 
Volume 
Fig. 3. The owrkill of internalisation policy [ROTHE:\GATTER (1992)j 
\'" ote that this measure is improving net \velfare. But if instead oftl a 
higher tax t2 is chosen, motiyated for instance by an analysis of externalities 
at the production leyel :1::\, then the resulting cost burden for the producer 
of externalities is too high. Instead of the optimal level XB the production 
is reduced to the level XD. In this case the net welfare effect may come out 
negative. The summing up the positive message of the IRU study is that 
a careful analysis of the optimal size of external costs is necessary. Over-
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stressing this message with the argument of positive externalities, however. 
means leaving the platform of welfare theory and entering into a world of 
fuzzy terminology which makes scientific discussion extremely difficult.' 
Thus. after externality calculations calibrating good internalising 
taxes may prove to be a hard issue as well. The challenge is especially diffi-
cult looking at the complicated social and economical situation of Hungary. 
Cheating the tax system, cheating traditional and new legal regulations is 
a common behaviour of people and companies. Thus reill effects and side 
effects, reactions to measures lllay be forecasted with great errors. 
5.S. Railway Transportation and Combined Transport as Potential 
AlteTTwtives 
Though this paper is about road user charges it is necessary to sum-
marise briefly some approaches \yith respect to the modal split between the 
road transport. the railway trallsport aud tIle combined transport. 
The choice of the mode of transport OIl demand side is basicall~' in-
fluenced by: 
the aCCt'ssibility of the different modes (ayailabilit:; uf fixed and rolling 
assets) 
the required time for the seryice (\yaitillg and nClnsplll'tatioll) time. 
ullcertaillties (flexibility). 
costs (price) 
character of the 
TheH 
to be trall:;portccl. 
('\L~ y) ita" lost of its 
since 1990. This 1l1lml)er i", lllailll~' cansed the: 
ciemaml of tilt' 
the terluiuatioll of rile illternational co-operatiun 
Small \' 
liuC's. 
eXIJort-
better performallce uf SOllle competitive railways with respeCT tu trall-
si t services, 
There are a couple of comparative achamages and disadvamages of 
the railway transportation compared with utileI' mudes of transit. 
major advantages a.re: 
high safety. 
low air pollution. 
preferable noise parameters. 
energy efficiency. 
luv; relative demand for space. 
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It is obvious that although such facts are important, only an environ-
mentally sensitive pricing system of other modes of transport may persuade 
the customers to choose rail services. 
Themnin disadvantages of railways art: 
longer time of transport. 100ver level of punctuality (not suitable for 
just in time services), 
higher cost of transport. 
100\'e1' level of commercial service quality. 
- smaller geographical accessibility. 
Investments lllay reduce some of these disadvantages. but others are 
cCLnsE'd by the basic characteristics of the given trctllSport mode. Combined 
traTt:sporr could be Cl part of rhe SolUTion to find the form in 
realising the llmtual advamages of modes. 
III Hungary a form of combillE'd transport Lac: t'xisted since the middle 
of the sevelltie;;: tht' carriage of container:". Ho·wever. less than of total 
transportE'd goods is carried by coma.ine1's. There are somE' fast target 
trains for the transport of COHt ainers. On the ot her hemd. some other 
sophisticated techniques han' been startE'd recE'ntly: 
Cl) The transport (mainl:,>' A llstrian aml German urders. ter-
. Szeged. Debrecen). around lL)()OO transported 
'hodic< per annUlll. The spread of this method is limited by the lack 
of the suitable hodie;;: 
h) The Ro-Lo since 1991. Currently ill operation between 
Szeged--\Veis. Soproll-\Vels and planued in other directions. The COll-
strncrioll of the terminals is supported by governments (in case of 
Sopron. Austrian) and the PHARE program. Other major costs of 
the csta hlishmcnt of such sel'yice is not completely solved. the lack 
of the purchased. leasE'd (fro111 Austria) special rolling stock is a ba.r-
rier of "'iclening the seryice. However. the potential capacity of the 
seryice is rdevant. e.g. the offered capacity of the Szeged-\Vels rela-
tion with -± pairs of trains (24 trucks per train) is close to 10% of the 
111lmber of entered lorries into Hungary. This service has been used 
mainly hy Turkish, Romanian, Bulgarian, Greek hauliers for rational 
reaS011S: taking into account the provided preferences with respect to 
road permit requirements and applied taxation system in Hungary 
and in Austria. \Vhen the economy of Ro-La service is approached. it 
is necessary to take into account the operation related costs in each 
of the involved countries. The reduction of the charging level for road 
transport in Austria (e.g. for et lorry over 18 ton gross weight between 
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Hegyeshalom and Passau 240 ATS must be paid now instead of the 
previous 2814 ATS) has certainly a negative effect on the competitive-
ness of combined transport in general, though because of the lack of 
permits and other reasons the services between Hungary and Austria 
have a higher occupancy rate than in other relations fiov;ing through 
Austria. \nlen there are proposals to renew the charging structure. 
the high elasticity has to be taken into account regarding to combined 
transport usage. 
c) The Ro-Ro service between Budapest and Passau is in operation since 
1991 with a capacity of about 100 lorries per "week. The service has 
a successful level of occupancy. In order to make this sen'ice more 
accessible, attractive and useful it 'would be reasonable to equip some 
other ports (Baja, Gyor) ,,;ith the required technology, 
5 .. .{ Parallel A..pplicailon of Tolls and [/ser 
Case of Hungary 
m 
According to the EC Directive of 03/89 IEEe therr is 110 possibility for the 
application of tolls and user charges in one :\Iember State except tolls on 
bridges, tunnels (Article 7), 
Ho,\yever, taking into account this regulation it can be considered that 
the partners v;ill be "willing to accept that in Hungary this regulation could 
be applied in a particular \vay. 
\Vhereas: 
there is serious need for a v;ell developed motor","\'ay Eet\york. 
the :\Iinistry of Transport has issued a BOT for extension all of thr 
motorways under a BOT schrme for strictl~, illYestoIS. 
there Clre 2 concession agreelnellTS in force (:\11-:',1 15. =\15 1l10IOl'\yay:-;) 
which oblige the state. 
other tendering procedures have reached sophis;:icatcd status. 
it can be stated. that Hungary - having a pioneer role has implemented 
meaningful efforts to establish a privately operated motorway network. 
The tolls under concessions are unquestionable. On the other hand. only 
limited deYelopment of the network could be realised witl! these exclusively 
private iUYestments. Approximately additional 150 km motol'\yay will be 
constructed by 2000. Having seen the indebtedness of the Road Fund 
for the forthcoming years, it has to be realised that (-with the real value 
keeping method) only insufficient deYelopment and maintenance of the road 
network will be reached. 
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The (road) user charge. if it is implemented may become a major tool 
for collecting some additional revenue for: 
a) proper maintenance and development of the state owned road net-
work. especi2Jly on the intensiyely used main roads (and probably for 
state operated remaining parts of the motonyays) 
b) prm'iding accept able circumstances for international flows inl out I 
Lhrough the country. replacing the existing bottlenecks \vith improved 
facilitie:i. and bettering: routes v,-idl high accident ratio:; (bypasses, ad-
ditional lalles. ete) 
c) for impw':ing the "itnation caused Dy road users in city centres and 
othE-r areas. 
The 11S(-1' on the of th(' assC't - can be 
applied according to the territorial principle. being 
non-discriminatory on nationalities. 
reflecting the co"t of the usage of the given vehicle category, 
in harmoll~- in its principle with the relenll1t regulations of the EC. 
Section 0.·5 contains four (A. B. C. D) possible :;cenarios to introduce 
a vignette/disk system. 
5.5. The Potential of the Introduction of Road User Charge 
(Vzqnette/Disk) System 
into account the terms and conditions of Council DireCTive 93/89/ 
EEC of 2·5 1993 the potential geographical scope of the application 
of the Yigllette/disk type WeLd user charge instrument may have A, B. C, 
D :icenarios: 
Scenario A. 
Scope: The vignette/disk is compulsory for any of yehicles \vith gross 
weight above 12 tons on the state operated motorways. expressways and 
on the primary road net\\-ork, (Trunk roads: 1. 2. 3. 4. 0. 6. 7. 8, 10. 1.5, 
21. 30. 40. 42,43, (0), 
The yignette/disk is not applied on the tolled motorways ""here the con-
cession right has been awarded for private concession companies. Such 
motorways are operated as tolled ones. 
A.dvantage: :\Iany of the motonyays and trunk roads ,,;ith heavy traffic 
flow become subject of the system. The priYate irwestments under BOT 
schemes are not effected at all. (On the \11 motorway between Budapest 
and Gyor no vignette system can be applied in the next decade according 
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to the Concession Agreement in force). :\Iain bridges could be charged 
addi tionally. 
Disadvantage: Some of the roads are categorised as part of the sec-
ondary road net,vork having heavy (international) flO\ys are not effected by 
the introduction (Roads 44, 52, 53, 55, 62. 81, 86). There is no way to 
introduce tolls on the state (owned company) operated motorway network 
(if any remains after the concluding of the tendering procedures). Inclusion 
of the primary road network requires diplomatic efforts. 
Scenario B 
Scope: As like in case of Scenario A and some elements of the sec-
ondary road network as additional. These complementary roads could be 
defined as the currently suggested transit roads (44. 52, 53, 55. 62. 81, 86) 
and/or roads v;ith 'E' logo (as like road 86 as a part of E65 route). 
The vignette/disk is not applied on the tolled moton,'ays \\'here the con-
cession right has been Cl\yarded for priYate concession companies. Such 
motonyays are operated as tolled ones. 
Advantage: All of the roads haying hea-.-y traffic flO\ys (ilttel'llal and 
international ones) are touched with the system. The priYately deyel-
oped and operated motorways arc not effected by the introduction (the 
:\11 Budapest-Gyor section could not be until 2005). The mail! 
bridges could be charged c_dditioIlall~'. 
Disadvantage: There is no \\"a~' for toll cullectioll OIl the state lO\VIll::d 
CO illp any ) operated IllotOl'\yays if . H ngc diplo111atic efforts are needed 
before implell1entarioll in order to a:-;s11 l't" The 
scope of implementation is well-based. 
Scenario C 
part Hers That the \vide 
5l cope: _~ll elell1ents of the intcr-s{'ttlclllcnt road netY',,"ork are 
except the 
A.dvantage: The potentially collect able allloullt from disk/vignette 
system charging reaches its maximised leyel. Bridges could be operated as 
tolled ones. 
Disadvantage: The introductioll of the system as such could cause 
serious concerns and increases the tellsions while the lorries are mainly the 
ones that also could be charged in case of Scenario B or A. :\0 \,>ay to 
introduce toll of the state operated motorways (if any). 
Scenario D 
Scope: Lorries using Hungarian motorway-expressway network, ex-
cept the privately operated tolled motor ways. 
Advantage: :\0 significant internal or international objecrion raising 
is expected. 
Disadvantage: The collected revenue "\vill be on a relatively low level. 
Real implementation could be imagined only if significant state operated 
motorway network v;ill remain after the tendering procedures for BOT. :\H 
Budapest-Gyor section (125 km) cannor be place of charging until 200,). 
Conclusion: According to the appraisal of rhe BLT Panel :\'lembers, 
if any of rile scenarios \,'ill haye become applied, the Scenario B seems to 
solution. 
D. there is an ildditional question: \,-hat categories 
of lorries shall be the sEbjects of charging depending on their gross "\veight. 
of view the 12 ton should be applied as bottom 
line of the In furt her differentiaTion 
could be based on 111l111ber of axles and ordering systen1. 
6. The EleIrlellts of the System of Road 
User 
6.1. Ideas ilnd Practice 
:\Iost countries tr:': to \york out systems of ambitious. fair and transparent 
Road 1:..'ser Charges. hO'\'\·C'-er. achiE'ving an ideal system (earlier symbol-
ised Fig. 1 and ,2) is very difficult. Series of political. social and 
fiscal decisions usually lead to the km·er. dOll ble fr2.med system of Fig. 4. 
Systematic long [erIll actiyit:-- may lee.d to an almost ideal system. The 
proposals coming ill Section 6.2 follm\' the principles of the :vEnistry of 
Transport (1994a) and of SCHARLE (1994). 
6.2. Proposed Afw811Te8. The New System of Road U8eT Charges 
The explanation to the proposed s~-stem of road user charges (referring to 
Tables 5 and 6) is the following: 
1. In 1995 the government proposed the increase of consumption tax on 
p11rchase by 109C. The law has been changed by 1st \lay 1995. 
\Vith this further tax increase the renewal of the old car fleet will slow 
dovm considerably. HoV,'eyeL this measure may be kept. 
2. To raise Vehicle Excise Duty by 200% is really radical. HO\\,eveL since 
1992 the 2000 HLF Iton basic rate did not increase with inflation, so 
this measure means only 509C increase on the originally determined 
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Current, 
distorted 
system of 
road user 
charges 
Year 
'1995 
V 
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V Series of political, social, fiscal decisions (and compromises) 
towards the ideal system. 
(Second best solutions, good ~ simulation of real costs) 
Business as usual decisions 
mainly influenced by the battles ~ of Ministry of Finance against 
the car-lobby. 
I 
Ideal system of 
road user charges 
(with electronic road 
pricing, internalisation etc.) 
(fair, transparent, market-
compatible etc.) 
-5% probability to achive it 
A mixed, controversial 
system with many 
deficiencies 
-95% probability to get to it 
Year 
-2040 
Fig. 4. The development process of the systems of road user charges 
taxation level. It may become a social problem that families v,ill be 
forced to sell their cars. bm these are the last years to do so: old. 
useless almost 0 yalue cars are reexponed to Romania and "Ckraine. 
This 'way fixed cost of motorisation should be raised as welL tak-
ing into account the lo\\" leyel of the resources ayailable for the Road 
Fund and for municipalities to ensure suitable maintenance and de-
yelopment activity. 
3. To reflect costs of local road handling (including also the using of 
public space) a l/ehicle Excise DlLty lI. component is proposed as a 
non-obligatory possibility for the local municipalities to collect ad-
ditional revenue. This is for road handling as a joint administratiye 
procedure with the generally applied YED. This additional duty could 
be leyied by the municipality according to the general location of the 
vehicle upon its decision as a Local Tax. The duty in principle should 
depend on the general location of the \"Chide. (Public space, private 
space, city centre, outskirts, etc.). \Vhat amount is required for the 
reliable handling of the road network in a given settlement'? 
To a reasonable extent land-use and social considerations may justify 
discounts 
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to cars of handicapped persons 
- to private cars (not to company cars) 
- to first cars of families. ete. 
-± 5 6. PeiTOl price \,'as considered to be the major tool for demand 
-{ 
management of car traffic. As it is known, high fuel price may deter 
socially beneficial journeys (\vith lmv external costs, typically in the 
countryside) while socially disadvantageous journeys may continue 
in big cities. This would justify keeping fuel prices at real terms. 
Hov;ever. petrol tourism seerns to cause serious loss to the country. 
Though this is strange. Hungarian fuel price index should be smaller 
thall;·· consumer price index during the forthcoming ~'ears. Travel de-
mand \vi11 nor if OIl the other hand appTOpriaie charges are 
intI'Ochlced where and c:riernaliiz.es. 
\Yith this principle the total fuel tax '.vithout VAT --. need not 
be increased in real terms. Charges are proposed \\'ith the follmving 
inner rates: 
(4.) the fuel tax must slightly decrease in real terms. 
(5.) the Road Fund Tax must increase quickly. 
(6.) the environmental product charge mUSI increase. 
State budget losses from ) \vill be counterbalanced internalising 
external costs. b)' extra \'AT revenues on parking ete. and by rmvs 
11 12. 
8. taxes on spaces and car parks 
may contribute both to substantial revenues and LO comprehensive 
land-use and transport policy. 
9. In Cl longer term, in 10 20 years electronic mail must come 
[0 practice. \Vithout it. prices and real costs (\\'ith external costs) 
become totally independent from each other. 
A market based supplementary licensing may be an efficient second 
best solution during the time of transition. 
10. a Tolls on bridges are also good and fair second best solutions. The 
theory' \,'as based by DCPCIT (1844. 1849). It has a tradition till 1918 
(FRIS:':Y_-\K (1987: HC:':FALVY (1856)) in Hungary. Looking at the 
present yalue of the existing Danube Bridges, paying attention to 20 
307'( inflation rate, it is clear that sewral billion HeF (8 - 12) annual 
revenue ivould be needed to cover maintenance and depreciation costs. 
It may well be the case that with certain conditions the Danube and 
Tisza Bridges should be privatised. Detrimental land-use effects may 
be reduced by season tickets and/or tax deduction schemes. Even 
if only 30 - .50% ownership and responsibility remain at the state, 
148 cs. OROSZ - A. KOVACS - GY. GALDJ 
Table 5 
Proposed future road user charges for cars in Hungary 
.. 1 ECU = 137.86 HUF constant [Jan. 10. 1995] 
Cars IndiTecl Charge Code Identification Charge or 
(and/or or vw of tax/unit 
Goods diTect ChaTge [ECU*' or %] 
Vehicles) chaTge [1995] ~ [1997] 
a b c d e f 
l. CaTs Indirect Vehicle Al Consumpl.ion Tax 0% ~ 10% 
Charge owneTship (Purchase Tax 10% ~ 20% 
or First 12% ~ 22% 
Registration Tax) 22% ~ 32% 
2. Cars Indirect Vehicle A3 VED I ~14.5 ~ 44 
Charge ownership ECU /ton, year 
Vehicle Excise 2.000 HUF/ton 
Duty 
6.000 H17Flton 
(Weight Tax= 
=Annual 
License Fee) 
3. Cars Indirect Vehicle VED II theoretically 
Charge ownership 0 00 
as Public EeC Iton, year 
space practically 
utilisation fee 0-400 
ECl; /ton, year 
4. Cars Indirect Taxes by A·S Fuel Tax ~0.25 ECUjl 
(and GV Charge vehicle [:36 HUF /1] 
together) usage; 
by amount 0.19 ECU/I 
of use [26 Hl:r jll 
(1993 value) 
.5. Cars Indirect Taxes by A6 Road Fund 0.07 ECUII 
(and GV Charge vehicle Tax of petrol 
together) usage; [9.5 HTr 11] 
by amount 
of use 0.10.5 ECUjl 
[14.25 HUr 11] 
6. Cars Indirect Taxes by A9 Environmental 0.01 ECUjl 
(and GV Charge vehicle product 
together) usage; charge [on 0.02 ECUjl 
by amount petrol, tyres, 
of use batteries, etc.] 
4 .5 - 6 
Together 
(. Cars IndIrect 
(ami GV 
together) 
B. ears Indirect 
(and GV Charge 
together) 
9. Cars Indirect 
(and GV Charge 
together) 
10.a Cars Direct 
(and GV Charge 
together) 
10.b Cars Direct 
(and GV Charge 
together) 
11. Cars Indirect 
(and GV Charge 
together) 
PROPOSAL TOWARDS A PAIR SYSTEA"f 
A.5+ 
A6+ 
A9 
Amount 
01 use 
and 
place 
and 
" I-1.1ne 
Amount of 
11se and 
place and 
time 
Place 
and time 
Table 5 
(continued 1) 
Total tax 
decrease from 
0.33 EeU /1 to 
0.:31.5 EeU /1> 
>0.245 ECU /1 
[ECU limit] 
+0.14 EeU/I 
19.6 HUF/I 
V 
A uIllcIpal tax 
on public 
parking 
charges 
A14 Tax on private 
(city centre) 
parking 
spaces 
Al.5 S-upplementa7'Y 
licensing 
(urban road 
To cover direct costs 
Price 816 Tolls on 
setting of bridges of 
operator Danube, Tisza 
etc. 
Price 816 Tolls on 
setting of private 
operator concession 
motorways, 
and on state 
owned 
motorways 
According consumption 
to safety tax on (net) 
record of third party 
vehicle insurance 
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from 0 
to 
10 20% 
all public 
parking 
0- 2 - .5% 
of potential 
yearly 
[eVenne 
[0.2.5 - 1..50 Eel' 
[35 - 200 HUFJ 
may be 
introduced] 
~0.04 0.10 ECLT/km 
for cars 
0.16 - 0.3.5 ECU /km 
for Goods 
Vehicles 
20 - 62 
ECU /vehicle 
25% 
consumption 
tax on (net) 
third party 
insurance 
150 
a 
12. Cars 
(and CV 
together) 
13. Cars 
(and GV 
together) 
14. Cars 
(and GV 
together) 
15. Cars 
(and GV 
together) 
15/T 
CaTS 
together') 
Cars 
and/Ol' 
Goods 
Vehicles 
b 
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c 
Table 5 
(continued 2) 
d f 
To cover state budget loss in fuel tax revenue 
To cover external costs 
Indirect According C17 Healih 80 2.50 ECr 
Charge to safety lllsurance 
record of fee on third 
vehicle party 
lllsurance 
Indirect as A9 C18 Envirollmental 
Charge protection tax 
Indirect CH) Recycling ~140 ECC/uH 
Charge Deposi1 ~20.000 HlT/car 
Penalties C19 Penalties for 
violation of the 
Hi<Tlnvav Code 
'" . 
lnd'ireci Code C'harge or 
r·! \'_:11arge '.ax/unil 
or V1(1 V' or 
direct of 199")j - [ 
chaTge 
privatisation could re,;ulr ill lllore «(, • em CH.:' 11 i (}pCl'cttiou and relief to state 
budget. 
10. b Tolls on motorways (except SOllle sections with bypass character) 
are considered to be necessary tools for development and for demand 
management. 
11 - 12. Externalities mccUl the greatest problem concernillg road ac-
cidents. As Table 4 and section 5.1 show, some 20 bn HDF (HOrn 
EGU) health care cost is covered by tax payers (health insurance pay-
el's) and not by road users. 
25% health insurance fee should be levied 011 third party iIlsurance to 
cover accident costs partly. 
25% consumption tax should also be levied on third party insurance. 
The collected 6.9 - 7 bll H"CF Illay partly cover costs of Road Adminis-
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tration 'with transport related costs of Police. Though the third party 
insurance system is not sophisticated yet (it is still independent from 
mileage, conditions of car-use, potential risk, ete.), the bonus-malus 
s)'stem slightly reflects the potential danger. Both health care and 
policing costs are in weak corrt"latioll with the frequency of accidents, 
ouly damage accidents. 
13 - 14. EnviroIlllleutal exterualities are partly financed by the emliron-
mental prodll.ct charge. The simplest method is to increase that factor 
and increase the sum to be usecl for environmental purposes. 
Table 6 
Goods In<lircci. Charge or 
VpLides or tax/unit 
(Hn~ci la.hle uf [ECU*~ or 
Cars) 6.:3. [199.5] [1991} 
a r: 
, f Cl J 
Hi. Indi1'Cd Vehicle A:? VAT 011 Ilormal .) - ('7' ",;;,..J If 
(} o ()(L, V" ilicies VAT but 
Vehicle,s refundabie 
1 f. Goods h'diner:! Vphicle . .'1.1 Vehicle Excise 14.,5 - 44 
\,ehic!p:i ci!argc EeT/ton 
Er systenl 011 
axles and 
ordering 
systern 
is.a Indirect Taxe;; :\5 Fuel Tax 
Goods chaTge by 
Vehicles vehicle 
(and car:-'l u8l1ge: 
toget her) by 
similar to fL1HoHnt 
row 1 of -use 
18.b IndiTed Taxes by AG Road f\Jlld 
Goods ch<lrge vehicle Tax 
Vehicle~ usage; by 
(and cars amount. of 
together) lJ:SP 
similar to 
row 5 
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Table 6 
(continued 1) 
a § c Atl e 18.c lnd~rect Taxes by EnVironmental f 
Goods charge vehicle product 
Vehicles usage; by charge [on 
(and cars amount of petrol, tyres, 
together) use batteries, etc.] 
similar to row 6 
19. Goods Indirect Vehicle A7 Tax according 
Vehicles charge usage; by to annual 
amount of use mileage 
20 - 21. Vehicle excise duty, and a vignette system. (See also row 17) 
20. Goods 
Vehicles 
21. Goods 
Vehicles 
Indirect Amount of 
charge use 
I ndirect Place 
Charge 
All VED faT 
foreign 
Goods 
Vehicles 
A12 Supplementary 
licensing 
(vignette) for 
motorways+ 
given 
categories of 
roads for 
residentials 
and foreigners 
above 12 to. 
'Road User 
Charge' 
0.023 
ECU /tonkm 
3 HUF /tonkm 
0.023 
ECU/tonkm 
/remains 
To regulate urban goods traffic and manage demand and congestion 
22. Goods Indirect Place and 
Vehicles Charge time 
(and cars 
together) 
similar to row 9 
A 15 Supplementary 
licensing 
(urban Toad 
USEr charge) 
To cover direct costs 
23. Goods 
Vehicles 
(and cars 
together) 
similar to row 10 
Direct 
Charge 
Price 
setting of 
operator 
B16 Tolls on 
bridges of 
Danube, Tisza 
etc. 
[0.25 7.00 
ECU 
35 - 900 HUF 
may be 
introd uced] 
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24. Goods Indirect 
Vehicles Charge 
similar to 
row 12 
2.5. Goods I ndirec~ 
Vehicles Charge 
siIl1~ar to 
rot..'/ 13 
Table 6 
(continued 2) 
To cover extemal costs 
c d e 
According C17 Third party 
to safety insurance 
record of 
vehicle 
Amount of C18 Environmental 
use Drotection tax 
COlnplelllenlary rneasures 
26. Goods Indirect Various All 
administrative 
and technical 
charges, fees, 
taxes 
Vehicles Charge 
(and cars 
together) 
27. 
Subtotal 
Goods 
Vehicles 
28. Total 
CaT's and 
Goods 
Vehicles 
/.ogetilc7' 
1.53 
f 
not !'elevant 
However, a clear eCLrmarking is justified in case of recycling of cars. A 
sum of 140 EeU could be asked as a deposit at the technical inspection 
when the cars are 6 years old. Refund can be made when the owner 
proves that his/her car was carried to a recycling site. 
15. Stricter enforcement of the Highway Code could result in better 
morals, and more revenue for better purposes. 
Goods vehicles (Table 6) 
16. To keep the right for reclaiming VAT when purchasing Goods Vehicles 
is reasonable. However, as goods vehicles are often used for other 
purposes, as the limit. between LGV's and cars is so small, further 
control is needed after the refunding of VAT in case of some vehicle 
categories (i.e. LGVs). 
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17. Vehicle Excise Duty should be levied basically from 1997 according 
to Er regulation, taking into account beyond the gross weight 
the number of axles and the ordering system as well. The charge in 
average \,-ill be approximately in the range of 42 44 EGC /ton. This 
level should be reached as with row 2. However. through a period 
of transition only half of the carrying capacity should be charged. 
This would ensure that Hungarian VED on trucks will be above the 
minimum level required by the EV for most categories from 1997. If 
it is not the case ill a given category the minimum ET.; required level 
may be charged. 
18. Fuel price and fuel taxation is to be the sallle as in Table 5 rows 4-6. 
19. Odam.de/' is clearly needed ill a long term. in order to levy realis-
tic infrastructure cost. A,s row 17 'VED' levies a very high duty on 
goods vehicles. it call bE' all option for smaller E'ntrE'prenelll's to reg-
ister their mileage (infrastructurE' usage) officially. a nd pay a red nced 
VED. Later odometers will be needed to everybody. V"itilout odome-
ter based OIl the existencE' of a possible disk/vignette system (a 
part of) the YED could be ckclllctible from the ha.ulier·s paymellt for 
vignette. 
20 - 21. To l'I:hidcs has diffE'l'{cut considerable op-
ticHls. ,-\li ,;olutio!ls cUlllaillillg illdiren charges may cailse foreigll 
affair~ (El . a(lIllilli~trari\"t· hllCLnClcU 
To th! P res el/ t arilflinisiTuti 1'1 {a ,;mall part 
of goods \"('hick~j 'wirh le,'e! of 0.02:3 km 
-\vhile other n~~:IS of the illfra~LI'llcturc are Hot 
COllser-\pcs the currenl 110t of the operator:-:; 
y\pith different natiullaliries. 
b) Replacing the whole systelll If' (j 
and li,-;f' -,,:irh the dilliculrie:, a" like: 
(f' • 
arra,Jr", 
~- disadvClll.tages to HUllgal'iall llalllier~ a:; CL response ill 
coulltries. 
siguificaut admini,;rratioll aud enforcement cost::; (as HECC;lE 
(1991, 1992) shows the net reY(~IlUe is 42 58%). 
-- additioual demand for Hsing the ulldf.'l'dcveioped H ullgariall ill-
frastruct1ll'e by the hauliers hayillg reducpd fees. 
decreasing the total revenue potential according to Section 5.5 
and the figures of the cUlTcmly collected VED. 
International political concerns call be handled with the geographical 
scope determiuecl iu scenario B. bm lowering the collected revenues 
lllay uot be allowed in the presE'nt situation of the country. 
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c) To keep the present administmtive system; to charge (a small part of 
the goods vehicles) VED with a significant level of 0.023 -
0.03 EeD /ton km and sillL'Ultaneously to introduce a disk/vignette sys-
tem .. If a haulier of a givell country is obliged to pay VED, he/she may 
reclaim (a part) of the road user charge paid in. Before introduction 
some efforts should be made in order to provide the necessary politi-
cal acceptance from the foreign partners of Hungary. vVith Scenario 
B it could be reached with a reasonable effort if Hungary keeps the 
generally applied charging ratp being in force in the EU countries. 
The final decision on th1:S subject is opt?:onal Gnd mainly political. 
However. the revenue potential is only 8 12 million EeD: less than 
1 of revenue::; collected in the highway sector. 
22 - 23. Su.pplcUI.eniary in towns is the same as row 9 in Table 5. 
The problem of tolls is the same as rm\' 10 in Table 5. 
24. The same as row 12. 
25. The same as row 13. 
26. Technical inspection eIlyirOlllllental inspection ovenveight control and 
other official steps require con::;iderable costs. Technical and adminis-
tratiye (central and local) costs should be fully covered by the vehicle 
owners. 
Tables 5. 6. show a totnl rel'enuc potential of 1.10 1.24 bn ECU 
(154 l'll/m HUF) compared to the forme/' 1993 values of 0.98 bn ECU 
(135 bn HUF). 
The proposed measnres are reasonable and fair. The main danger is 
that municipalities \villllot levy the additional charges listed in Tables 5 -
6 (lines 3, (,8,9). Similar problems occur with tolls 1}'ows lOa. 16), with 
policing and "lvith health carC' costs (rows 11. 12, 24, 25) at government 
level. 
7. Proposed Further Research Topics 
There is a llumber of fields ".'here H ungariall practice and documentation 
seems to be poor in international comparison. These fields are to be iden-
tified as p/'oposed topics for further research: 
1. The allocation of infrastTlLct1LTe costs to vario1Ls vehicle/user cate-
gories (cars, trucks, motor-cycles alld buses). 
2. The analysis of the main effects (and side effects) of present Hungar-
ian taxation pmctice on transportation. 
3. Proposal f01' a reasonable Hungarian geneml taxation policy concern-
ing transportation. [Major issues to be included: 
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- incentives or taxation on cOIllmuting; 
rail-road competition in freight traffic; 
harmonised measures. subsidy and/or tax on public transport 
and on individual transport: 
social equity: 
company car as a major instrument to cheat the tax and social 
insurance system.] 
4. The share of black economy in the H'unga'!'ian tmnspoTiation secto'!'. 
Three kinds of data sets should be compared: 
a) Data given by hauliers/taxi drivers to the tax authority. 
b) Data derived from earlier statistics/statistical methods. 
c) Realistic data based on surveys, traffic surveys. statistics. inter-
views, etc. 
5. The evaluation of external costs of transport with the 
rail 
shipping and 
aviation 
subsectors of Hungary. The INFRAS-IVV\V methodology should be 
used for Hungary again, in order to get comparable data with 17 
European countries [for these countries the calculation has already 
been completed. Look INFRAS-IWW (1994)j. 
6. The detailed analysis of health care costs caused by accidents in the 
road. 
raiL 
shipping and 
aviation 
subsectors of HUllgary. 
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